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I. INTRODUCTION 
Should there be greater participation by legislators and citizens 
in constitutional debate, theory, and decisionmaking? An increasing 
number of legal theorists from otherwise divergent perspectives have 
recently argued against what Paul Brest calls the "principle of judicial 
exclusivity" in our constitutional processes. 1 These theorists contend 
that because issues of public morality in our culture either are, or tend 
to become, constitutional issues, all political actors, and most notably 
legislators and citizens, should consider the constitutional implica-
tions of the moral issues of the day. Because constitutional questions 
are essentially moral questions about how active and responsible citi-
zens should constitute themselves, we should all engage in constitu-
tional debate. We should stop relying on the courts to shoulder the 
burden of resolving the constitutional consequences of our political 
decisions. According to this argument, our methods of resolving 
moral issues in this country are "deeply flawed."2 The flaw is that we 
have delegated to the courts, rather than kept for ourselves, the moral 
responsibility for our decisions. By protecting, cherishing, and rely-
ing upon judicial review, we have essentially alienated our moral pub-
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to 
thank Mark Tushnet, Martha Minow, Frank Michelman, and my research assistant Quincie 
Hopkins for extremely helpful comments and criticisms relating to an earlier draft of this 
piece. Any errors that remain are my own. 
I. Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. I, 6 (1986). 
2. ld. at I. 
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lic lives to the courts. 3 
I agree with Brest that our methods of resolving issues of public 
morality in this culture are deeply flawed, but I view with skepticism 
both the diagnosis-insufficient community participation in constitu-
tional processes-and the cure-increased community participation 
in constitutional processes-suggested by the participation theorists. 
The call for increased participation in constitutional thought rests on 
the assumptions that constitutional questions are moral questions, 
and that constitutional debate is the forum in which we engage in 
moral decisionmaking. From these assumptions it follows that all cit-
izens, not just courts, should take up issues of constitutionalism. If 
we take very seriously the text of the opinions in a significant number 
of recent constitutional cases, however, it is clear that as a descriptive 
matter, the assumption that constitutional questions are moral ques-
tions is flatly false. According to the Justices themselves, constitu-
tional issues are by definition legal issues, as opposed to moral issues.4 
Countless "neutral principles" constitutional theorists as well insist 
upon making a distinction between constitutional issues and moral 
issues. 5 Thus, according to a well-respected strand of constitutional 
theory, as well as an increasing number of recent cases, constitutional 
questions are definitionally amoral, as are the answers they propose. 
Two recent cases exemplify the amorality of modern constitu-
tional decisionmaking. In Bowers v. Hardwick,6 Justice White, speak-
ing for the Supreme Court of the United States, explicitly disclaimed 
the need to examine the morality of consensual sodomy, as well as 
either the wisdom or the morality of legislating against it. 7 In fact, 
Justice White claimed that the only issues for the Court to decide 
were whether individuals have a constitutional right to engage in sod-
omy, (they don't), and whether legislators have the constitutional 
power to legislate against it, (they do). The Court did not take up the 
morality of consensual homosexuality or the morality of homophobic 
communities. Indeed, Justice White's opinion does not even hint at 
what sodomy is, much less examine whether it has any moral value or 
detriment to communal or individual life. In remarkably similar lan-
guage in Roe v. Wade,S Justice Blackmun also disclaimed the need to 
3.Id. 
4. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 140, 145 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
116, 148, 159 (1973). 
5. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 
(1959). 
6. 478 U.S. 140 (1986). 
7. Id. at 145. 
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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explore the morality of abortion or of statutes making it a criminal 
offense.9 In both cases, the Court explicitly reformulated the underly-
ing moral questions-the morality of abortion and laws restricting its 
availability and the morality of consensual homosexuality and of laws 
making it a crime-into amoral constitutional questions: What is the 
scope of the individual's "right to privacy" accorded by the Constitu-
tion? Does the legislature have the power to criminalize what it sees 
fit to criminalize? Does the Court have the power to overturn legisla-
tive outcomes? In both Hardwick and Roe, the Court framed the 
issue in this way in order to at least give the appearance of avoiding, 
rather than participating in, the underlying moral debate regarding 
the conduct in question. 
In the first part of this essay, I suggest that "constitutional ques-
tions" are always ambiguous, and that according to one standard 
interpretation, constitutional questions are indeed amoral, as the 
"neutral principles" theorists, and the opinions in Hardwick and Roe 
insist. I also argue, however, that contrary to the celebratory tone of 
those who favor amoral constitutional decisionmaking, the aggressive 
amorality of modern constitutional decisionmaking by the Court is 
itself a flaw, even a disease, of our modern politics, rather than a vir-
tue of our law. If this is correct, then constitutional decision making, 
at least as it is done at present, should not serve as a model for citizen 
and legislative debate of issues of public morality. This is especially 
true if the aim is to increase citizen participation in moral debate 
about how we should constitute our social lives. Rather, we should be 
thankful for those shrinking spheres of moral debate still uncontami-
nated by constitutional modes of argument. In other words, the cure 
for the problem presented by this low level of citizen participation in 
debate over issues of public morality in this culture is not to expand 
participation in constitutional decisionmaking. If constitutional ques-
tions are by definition not moral questions, and if we want to improve 
the quality and quantity of public debate of moral issues, then we 
should strive to shrink, not expand, the sphere of constitutional influ-
ence. Our modern constitutional processes are part of the problem for 
which we need to find a cure. They are not part of the_ solution. 
The remainder of this essay examines, diagnoses, and suggests a 
cure for the amorality of modern constitutional discourse. I argue 
that it is not necessarily the case that constitutional questions are 
posed, debated, and resolved as amoral questions of legitimacy and 
power, rather than as moral questions about how we should constitute 
our lives. Historically, it has not always been the case and it need not 
9. Id. at 116, 148, 159. 
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always be so in the future. It is neither logically nor legally mandated 
by the internal structure of constitutional law. Rather, the amorality 
of modern constitutional questions and answers is in part a psycho-
logically, as opposed to legally, mandated authoritarian reaction to 
the diseased state of the modern political theory that underlies our 
constitutional framework. If we can improve the political theory 
upon which constitutional law rests, we might be able to reinvigorate 
constitutional decisionmaking with a sense of moral purpose. Only 
after we reinject into constitutional thought and law a self-consciously 
moral dimension will it make sense to call for greater participation by 
the community in constitutional processes. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
The simple explanation for why constitutional questions strike 
only some of us as moral questions, and then only some of the time, is 
that constitutional questions are patently ambiguous. On the one 
hand, constitutional questions, like constitutional theory, doctrine, 
and law, sometimes address the manner in which we choose to consti-
tute ourselves. In this sense, constitutional questions concern the 
manner in which we as a society choose to constitute the individual 
self, the community, and the government. Constitutional questions, 
so understood, are clearly m~ral questions: How should we constitute 
the individual, the community, and the government? These are, I 
believe, the kinds of questions that Brest and other participation theo-
rists have in mind when they implore other political actors to engage 
in constitutional decisionmaking. I call this, however unimagina-
tively, the normative tradition in constitutional law. 
On the other hand, constitutional questions, as well as constitu-
tionallaw, theory, issues, and history, often address something very 
different. "Constitutional questions" are the set of questions that con-
cerns how we are authorized by a binding legal document-the histor-
ical Constitution-to constitute ourselves. When understood in this 
context, constitutional questions do not concern the manner in which 
we, as a society, should constitute ourselves. Rather, they concern the 
manner in which we, as a society, are authorized to constitute our-
selves by a binding, authoritative document. Here, constitutional 
questions are not moral questions at all. They are at best historical 
questions. The question is at root, "What does the Constitution com-
mand?" not "How should we constitute ourselves?" Of course, con-
stitutional questions understood in this way are more than simply 
historical questions, because we are asking them in our search for 
direction and guidance concerning how to live our lives. But this 
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additional directive dimension does not make them moral questions. 
Rather, they are questions we ask of an authority, whether we per-
ceive that authority to be the Framers or the text. In this conception, 
constitutional questions ask, "How have we been told to behave?" or 
"How have we been ordered to constitute ourselves?" not "How 
should we behave?" or "How should we constitute ourselves?" I call 
this the "authoritarian tradition" in constitutional law. If this is the 
tradition that Brest and others have in mind when they call for 
increased citizen participation in constitutional decisionmaking, then 
I would suggest that their quest is fundamentally misconceived. 
The difference between the normative and the authoritarian tra-
ditions, with their distinctive ways of conceiving of the meaning of 
constitutional questions, can be captured by an analogy. Imagine a 
group of children on a schoolyard trying to organize the recess play 
period so as to make that time as delightful, imaginative, fun, and free 
of conflict as is possible. They might go about this task by asking 
themselves how they want to "constitute" their time, themselves, 
their games, and their groups during the recess period. Should they 
insist that everyone participate in a game? Or, maya child stand off 
alone, either by choice, or because he or she has been shunned by 
others? Should they organize all of the time, or leave some free? 
Their answers to these and related "constitutional" questions will 
depend on how they value, perceive, and conceive of the individual, of 
groups, and of play. Do groups evidence a desirable social impulse 
that should be encouraged or mandated, or a chauvinistic, mean-spir-
ited dislike of difference and idiosyncracy? Is time spent standing idle 
valuable time, or does it always evidence misery? Is the "individual" 
actualized by solitary activity, or do individuals achieve their highest 
fulfillment in social interaction? These are all moral questions. The 
answers the children give to these and other more concrete "constitu-
tional questions," such as whether they will require mandatory partic-
ipation in games, will involve the children in moral debate about the 
value of individualism, the value of participation, and the value of 
their play. And, as Brest and the other participationists insist, it is 
surely true that all the children should participate in these constitu-
tional dialogues rather than a select few, whether they view them-
selves as "game leaders," "game players," or as loners who hate 
organized games and would rather idle the hour away alone. 
The children, however, might go about the task of organizing the 
recess period on the playground in a different way, that corresponds 
roughly with what I'm calling the authoritarian tradition. They 
might settle the question by asking the teacher what they are and are 
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not permitted to do. This might be a perfectly sensible way to go 
about the task, particularly if their unstructured normative dialogue 
about how they should govern themselves has turned into fistfights 
rather than free-spirited debate. Of course, even if they structure the 
time period by submitting to the dictates of the authority, they still 
will have to ask themselves questions that are constitutional. The 
teacher will give them a directive, but they will still have to "inter-
pret" it. The children will have to ask themselves what the teacher's 
instructions meant in order to apply them. For example, the teacher 
may have told them that they must all participate in loosely struc-
tured games, and if so then they will have to decide whether a child 
amusing herself with a sack of marbles is playing a game, or whether, 
on the other hand, participation in a loosely structured game requires 
the presence of two or more. This question, in turn, will involve them 
in standard interpretation debates, and will force them to confront 
questions that bear a striking resemblance to the questions that would 
have arisen, had they proceeded in the non authoritarian normative 
tradition. Obviously, whether a child playing marbles by herself is 
playing a game depends on the value and meaning of individual play, 
and the value and meaning of participation. The answers to these 
questions in turn depend not only on what the teacher intended, but 
how the children feel about the matter. But this superficial resem-
blance between the constitutional questions asked in the normative 
and authoritarian traditions, respectively, will never become identical, 
no matter how great the convergence. In the latter context, the chil-
dren are interpreting the teacher's directive because they have decided 
to resolve the constitutional question in the authoritarian rather than 
normative tradition. They have decided to organize their time by 
doing what the teacher tells them to do, rather than by figuring out 
what they should do. They have decided to obey an authority, rather 
than govern themselves. Their constitutional questions are aimed 
toward obedience, not the end of moral self-governance. 
As a group, the school children will probably be more inclined to 
embrace the normative tradition if their relations with each other are 
minimally cordial, decent, and respectful. If they already trust each 
other, and have some sense of each other's good faith, they wiil proba-
bly be more likely to resolve the constitutional questions posed by the 
recess hour by discussion, debate, and consensus. On the other hand, 
they will be more inclined to embrace an authoritarian attitude 
toward the constitutional issues that face them on the school yard if 
they distrust each other, if they are afraid of bullies or gangs, or if 
they have already come to blows. The weaker members of the group 
may be more inclined to invoke the aid of the "higher" authority. To 
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the extent that the children all fear being the weaker party themselves, 
or to the extent that they sympathize with the weak, they too may 
share the inclination to settle their basic constitutional differences by 
submitting to the will, direction, or mandate of a "higher" authority. 
The schoolyard terrorized by the bully or the gang is more likely to be 
governed ultim'ately by the teacher, rather than by participatory deci-
sions of the group. 
Another way to see the difference between these two constitu-
tional traditions is to note the radically different roles the text plays in 
each tradition. The relation of the text to the normative tradition is 
highly problematic. The constitutional text at times facilitates but 
often obstructs decisionmaking in the normative tradition, both on 
the school yard and in our own constitutional adjudication. If consti-
tutional questions are questions about how we should constitute our-
selves, then the existence of a text that authoritatively mandates some 
answers to these constitutional questions, and authoritatively pre-
cludes others, poses at least two problems. First, the constitutional 
answers it gives may be wrong; the Constitution may fail to mandate 
those forms in which we should constitute ourselves and may in fact 
mandate undesirable forms. Second, its very existence may deter us 
from engaging in the participatory discussions we need to answer our 
constitutive questions within the normative tradition. Of course, the 
text will at times facilitate our search. It is always a source of insight 
into how others answered similar questions in the past. This facilita-
tive function, however, is both incidental and also shared by other 
significant texts of our past and present, including the writings of 
Aristotle, J.S. Mill, John Rawls, and Roberto Unger. Alternatively, 
. the text may be so general that, although it does not constitute a seri-
ous obstacle to self-discovery of our ideal constitution, it does not 
guide it either. What is clear, though, is that the text as an authorita-
tive text that tells us what we must do is in no sense necessary to the 
normative tradition in constitutional law. We can ask normative 
questions: How should we govern ourselves? How should we consti-
tute the self, the community, the government, the recess period, our 
play? We might better ask them without resort to an authoritative 
text as the first step in answering them. 
By contrast, the text, no matter how understood, is absolutely 
necessary to the authoritarian tradition in constitutional law. If, by 
"constitutional question," we mean, "How must we constitute our-
selves under the mandate of an authoritative text?" then there must be 
some text, either behavioral, written, or cultural, to which we can 
turn to ascertain the content of the authoritative order. We may 
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regard the text as the means by which we ascertain the intent of the 
original authors, as a free standing authority, or as reflective of our 
own best interests or instincts. However we regard it, though, it is 
something other than our present selves. We turn to it to tell us how 
to live, because we have abandoned the project of our own moral self-
governance. We turn to the text because we wish to obey it. We 
crave obedience when we have despaired of our own moral compe-
tence, and hence self-governing moral authority. 
Our constitutional history has never been either entirely norma-
tive or entirely authoritarian. Nevertheless, we can imagine what a 
purely normative constitutional tnidition might look like. In a purely 
normative tradition, the Court, as well as every other political actor, 
would define a "constitutional question" as "How should we, as a 
society, constitute ourselves?" In such a world, the constitutional text 
itself would have historical significance and persuasive authority as a 
"foundational text," but it would have no binding power. The consti-
tutional text would be on par with other significant historical texts of 
our culture. These would include prior cases, and classics of both the 
liberal and repUblican traditions. We might turn to all of these texts, 
including the constitutional text, for guidance, wisdom, accumulated 
knowledge, and historical information. We would not turn to any of 
them, including the constitutional text, for commands to be obeyed. 
A purely authoritarian constitutional tradition is easier to imag-
ine, because it is closer to the constitutional practices of this decade. 
When the authoritarian tradition dominates, the authority of the text, 
however loosely defined, is absolute, regardless of the wisdom or mer-
its of its mandates. The question is, "What are we being ordered to 
do?" not "What should we do?" Aristotle and Mill count for nothing, 
because they are not legal "authorities." Normative argument in its 
entirety counts for nothing, because it has no "legitimacy."10 Consti-
tutional opinions are short and to the point, as in Bowers v. Hardwick. 
The issue becomes, "What does the Constitution permit?" and "Who 
has the power to do what, according to the structure mandated by the 
original authority?" rather than "How should we lead our lives or 
structure our community?" There is neither foundation nor need for 
moral debate, for these are not moral questions; they are "purely 
political" in the most barren sense. When we ask a constitutional 
question in the authoritarian tradition, we seek to know what the 
authority permits-whether we understand the "authority" as the 
framers, majorities, precedents, or a disembodied text. The authorita-
10. For a strong endorsement of this position, see Easterbrook, The Supreme Court. 1983 
Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984). 
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rian tradition in constitutional decisionmaking by definition precludes 
moral debate. For this reason, the modern vitality of the authorita-
rian tradition in constitutional decisionmaking is a significant obstacle 
to both public and judicial debate of issues of morality in this legal 
culture. 
These two competing constitutional traditions, I believe, are 
always "with us" as potential ways to conceive of constitutional ques-
tions. At any time, a court posing a "constitutional question" can 
pose it either as a normative question about how we should constitute 
ourselves, or as an authoritarian question about the content of the 
Constitution's mandates. If we want to know how to improve both 
the quality and quantity of debate over issues of public morality in 
this culture, we might begin by trying to ascertain what prompts a 
court or a time period toward the authoritarian tradition in constitu-
tional decisionmaking, and what might prompt it away from authori-
tarianism and toward a more normative posture. When, and why, do 
courts or legislatures lean toward the authoritarian constitutional tra-
dition, and recoil in fear from the normative, and when do they lean 
toward the normative tradition and recoil from the authoritarian one? 
In the remainder of this essay I suggest one hypothesis. I sug-
gested above that the children on the school yard might lean toward 
an authoritarian resolution of their constitutional questions when the 
social bonds between them have badly deteriorated. My hypothesis is 
that courts and commentators are presently inclined toward an 
authoritarian and hence amoral resolution of our constitutional ques-
tions in part because modern interpretations of our underlying polit-
ical theories, liberal pluralism and civic republicanism, reflect our 
anxieties about ourselves, fears about others, and our asocial and even 
psychopathological tendencies, rather than our social aspirations. 
The modern judicial impulse toward authoritarian decisionmaking in 
constitutional cases might in part be a reaction to the sorry self-por-
trait we have cast in our modern political theory. If we are as we 
paint ourselves in our political theory-incapable of creative and 
moral constitutional self-governance-then we are in dire need of 
authoritarian control. 
III. AGNOSTIC SELF IMAGES AND THE 
AUTHORITARIAN IMPULSE 
Our constitutional law and decisionmaking rest on an uneasy 
alliance between two images that may be both complementary and 
contradictory: a liberal conception of the self, and a republican con-
ception of the community. At some times in the history of our polit-
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ical theory, the liberal "self" dominates the republican "community" 
both in importance and in priority. When it does, value is believed to 
emanate from the desires, wishes, and preferences of individuals. At 
such times, this theoretical hierarchy is reflected in constitutional 
decisionmaking; a "liberal" court tends to expand the rights of indi-
viduals, so as to give them priority over the desires of groups, commu-
nities, and legislatures, unless the desires of groups can be defended 
on grounds acceptable to liberals. Roe was perhaps the last and clear-
est manifestation of the power of a strong liberal conception of the self 
in constitutional decisionmaking. 
At other times in the history of our political theory, the republi-
can "community" dominates, in importance and priority, the liberal 
"self." At these times, the "community" rather than the individual is 
regarded as the source of value, so that the desires, wishes, and prefer-
ences of the community are both more important than, and prior to, 
the desires, wishes, and preferences of individuals. Although the lib-
eral conception of the self has strong and constant ties to both polit-
ical and historical liberalism, the relationship of the republican 
conception of the community to our political traditions is more com-
plex. Republicanism has potentially contradictory ties to both social 
conservatism and utopian radicalism, depending upon the identity of 
the "community" being valued. Thus, conservatives value the various 
"communities" of power, wealth, and privilege that have established 
historical traditions and institutions, which in turn embody lasting 
cultural achievements. By contrast, radicals value the various com-
munities, both actual and idealized, of the disempowered. Conserva-
tives and radical republicans agree, however, on a communitarian 
rather than rigidly individualistic definition of value. 
Although the influence of radical, utopian republicanism in con-
stitutional law has been minimal, II conservative republicanism has 
enjoyed greater success. When conservative republicanism dominates 
our theory, as I believe it does today, the Court tends to protect the 
power of the extant, rather than ideal community. Through their leg-
islatures, these communities express and impose their desires, and 
thereby perpetuate the institutions and traditions that reflect their his-
torical dominance. Correlatively, a conservative republican Court will 
denigrate its own power to intervene in order to protect individual 
freedoms. Therefore, just as the liberal instinctively distrusts legisla-
tive restraints on individual autonomy, so the conservative republi-
can, and to a lesser extent all republicans, instinctively distrust 
judicial restraints on legislative freedom. Hardwick is clearly such a 
11. But see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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conservative republican case. From a liberal point of view, the Court 
failed to protect the individual from group interference. From a 
republican perspective, however, the Court rightly affirmed the 
group's conception of value and the common good, as defined by and 
enforced through legislative pronouncement. Hardwick and Roe thus 
represent two ends of a political spectrum. In Roe, the Court struck 
down both the group value of sanctity of life as well as a particular 
conception of family life, because they conflicted with a liberal femi-
nist conception of the self. In Hardwick, the Court upheld the group 
value of family, and arguably the group prejudice of homophobia, 
while rejecting a liberal and libertarian vision of the self and of sexual 
freedom. 
As different as they are, however, Hardwick and Roe share one 
important feature. In both opinions, the Justice writing the opinion 
explicitly disclaimed moral debate. Both cases-one liberal, one 
republican-exemplify the authoritarian constitutional tradition and 
explicitly disavow the normative one. In both cases, the Court pur-
ported to explicate what the Constitution dictates, rather than to ask, 
much less answer the question, "How should we constitute our-
selves?" This commonality, I believe, is not coincidental. Rather, it 
reveals a deeper commonality between one possible interpretation of 
the liberal self-image, upheld in Roe, and one possible interpretation 
of our repUblican communitarian image, upheld in Hardwick. 
Just as constitutionalism itself embraces both authoritarian and 
normative modes of decisionmaking, so too do our "liberal" and 
"republican" traditions embrace competing conceptions of their pri-
mary substantive commitments. First, the "liberal tradition" moves 
ambiguously between what I call an "agnostic" conception and 
endorsement of the self, and a "pragmatic" conception and endorse-
ment of the self. According to the "agnostic" conception of the self, 
the "individual" and his preferences, desires, tastes, and conception of 
the good life are valued tautologically, independently of their worth, 
because value is defined as "that which the individual desires." 
According to the "pragmatic" conception, by contrast, the "individ-
ual" is valued because an individualistic life is believed to be a good 
life. Similarly, our republican tradition also moves ambiguously 
between what can be called an "agnostic" endorsement of the com-
munity and a pragmatic one. According to the "agnostic" conception 
of the community, the community'S preferences, wishes, and desires 
are valued because value is defined as that which the community has 
valued or would value in a utopian vision. According to the "prag-
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matic" conception, by contrast, the "community" is valued because a 
communitarian life is believed to be a good life. 
It is important to note that "agnostic liberalism" and "agnostic 
republicanism" are more similar than dissimilar, as are "pragmatic 
liberalism" and "pragmatic republicanism." Agnostic liberalism and 
agnostic republicanism share their agnosticism: They both value and 
prioritize what each regards as the primary moral unit tautologically. 
Pragmatic liberalism and pragmatic republicanism similarly share 
their pragmatism. My general claim is that the authoritarian impulse 
in constitutional law, exemplified in both Roe and Hardwick, is a 
response to the dominance of what is an unhealthy agnosticism in 
both of our dominant political theories. 
Thus, Roe rests on and endorses an agnostic liberal conception of 
the self: The value of an individually chosen life plan is assumed tau-
tologically. The Court does not defend the proposition that an "indi-
vidualistic" life that includes reproductive choice is more worthy than 
a less individualistic life that does not. Rather, in keeping with agnos-
tic liberalism, "value" and "worth" and the nature of the "good" are 
assumed to emanate from individual choice, rather than constitute a 
criterion against which to judge individual choice. Similarly, Hard-
wick rests on and endorses an agnostic republican conception of the 
community: The value of the legislatively chosen prohibition of 
homosexuality is assumed tautologically. The Court does not defend 
the proposition that a community that criminalizes homosexuality is 
more worthy than one that does not, because "value" and "worth" 
and "the good" are assumed to emanate from communitarian choice, 
rather than constitute criteria against which to judge community 
choice. 
In both cases, the Court moved from an agnostic conception of 
value, to an authoritarian mode of constitutional decisionmaking. In 
both cases, the Court asked the question, "What does the Constitu-
tion permit?" rather than "How should we constitute ourselves?" In 
each case, the Court had no way even to discuss, much less decide, 
whether the reproductive choice or the homophobic preference would 
contribute to a defensible conception of individualism or communitar-
ianism respectively. In each case, the Court decided whether to pro-
tect the challenged choice or preference by a nonreflective and 
ultimately arbitrary invocation of the "authority" of the binding Con-
stitution, for the agnostic theory of value with which it began left the 
Court with little choice to do otherwise. Thus, the choice between 
agnostic and pragmatic conceptions of value, and not the conflict 
between liberalism and republicanism, may determine whether our 
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courts will take an authoritarian or normative attitude toward consti-
tutional questions. 
To make this claim more plausible, let me briefly describe these 
four traditions: agnostic liberalism, agnostic republicanism, prag-
matic liberalism, and pragmatic republicanism. The purely agnostic 
definition of value, and correlatively, the purely agnostic image of the 
self within the liberal tradition should be familiar to legal academics. 
, The law and economics school embraces agnostic liberalism in its 
most absolute form. To the legal economist, the "self" is both atom-
istic and definitive of value. Fulfillment of the individual's desires 
produces wealth, and hence value, regardless of the content of the 
desire, preference, or choice at stake. Choice, notably economic 
choice, becomes the hallmark of justice and value to the agnostic lib-
eral. Beyond insuring equal access to economic choice, then, the 
community, the legislature, and most generally the state should be 
agnostic toward conflicting individual desires and conceptions of the 
good. Legislative pronouncements of the nature of the good are not 
simply distrusted, as they are in more classical liberal conceptions. 
They are nonsensical; visions of the good are definition ally individual-
istic, because it is the individual, not the group, that is the source of 
value. Given this agnostic image of the self, normative (hence moral) 
discourse within liberalism is impossible because it is conceptually 
incoherent. Our "norms" cannot be the subject of debate, because 
our norms, values, and moral commitments are but disguised prefer-
ences, and our preferences are individualistic, given, and of equal 
weight. We value the individual's values tautologically. The individ-
ual is the source of value. 
The agnostic image of the community within the republican tra-
dition is also becoming familiar. Chief Justice Burger strikes an 
unfortunately common chord in Hardwick when he argues that the 
Georgia legislature's homophobic statute should be upheld in part 
because sodomy historically has been regarded as a crime worse than 
rape. To agnostic republicanism, the group is as definitive of value as 
is the individual to agnostic liberalism. Fulfillment of the group's 
. desires produces value, regardless of the content of those desires, and 
regardless of their lineage. Participation in the group, ideally political 
participation, becomes the hallmark of justice and value to the agnos-
tic republican. Beyond ensuring full participation, then, the courts 
should be agnostic toward competing conceptions of the good gener-
ated by varying groups, whether ideal, as in utopian conceptions, or 
historical, as in, conservative ones. Given this agnostic image of the 
group, normative discourse within republicanism is impossible 
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because it is conceptually incoherent. We can perfect group processes 
to minimize the impact of impermissible hierarchy, but beyond that 
we cannot second-guess group values. The norms of the community 
are beyond the scope of moral debate because those norms are the 
genesis of the community's morality. 
The images of the self and the community that underlie these 
agnostic traditions have much in common that is beyond the scope of 
this essay. One thing they share, however, is the fact that when 
embraced, both of them cry out for an authoritarian response, when-
ever an individual or group value is challenged on constitutional 
grounds. There are two reasons, the first of which is simply logical. 
The question, "How should we constitute the individual?" is mean-
ingless in an agnostic liberal tradition, as is the question, "How 
should we constitute the community?" in an agnostic repUblican tra-
dition. There is no way even to discuss, much less decide, the value of 
a troubling and constitutionally challenged individual or group pref-
erence-such as the individual's preference for abortion in Roe, or the 
group's preference for criminalizing sodomy in Hardwick. Agnosti-
cism in both traditions identifies value with preference. It accordingly 
precludes a normative challenge to a preference, either individual or 
group. We cannot ask whether a challenged preference is a "good" 
preference or a "bad" preference, when good means preferred. If we 
wish to consider any challenge at all-and the Constitution clearly 
directs us to do so-we can only ask whether a challenged preference 
is permitted. When a difficult case arises, we have no choice but to 
ask only the bare authoritarian question: "Does the authoritative 
Constitution permit it?" 
The second reason is psychosocial, and somewhat more specula-
tive. The "individual" in the agnostic liberal tradition is not just the 
source of value, he is also antagonistic, atomistic, selfish, and psycho-
pathic or sociopathic. He is incapable of social bonding without the 
added incentive of an authoritarian, Leviathan threat. Nor will he 
benefit from social bonding beyond that nec;:ded to minimize violent 
antagonism. Similarly, the "group" in the agnostic repUblican tradi-
tion is not just the source of value. It is also intensely conformist 
internally, and intensely chauvinistic and xenophobic externally. The 
group is defined by its comparative virtue to outsiders, whether the 
outsiders are out-of-staters, aliens, racial minorities, or homosexuals. 
The group is well-bonded internally, but perhaps because it is so well 
bonded, it is incapable of accepting idiosyncracy, differences, or 
minorities qn its own impetus. Nor does it benefit from exposure to 
idiosyncracy, difference, or minority points of view. If these self and 
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group portraits are at all accurate, then "constitutional questions" 
cannot possibly facilitate normative discourse between competing lib-
eral and republican conceptions of the good, any more than the dic-
tates of the authoritarian teacher can facilitate normative discourse on 
the schoolyard populated by warring gangs. In other words, the self-
portrait we have drawn in our agnostic liberal and agnostic republican 
traditions is that of a schoolyard populated by individual bullies and 
communitarian gangs. If we are as we paint ourselves as being, then 
we have forsaken all sense of value, worth, or well-being, other than 
whatever is desired or produced by the most powerful individuals and 
groups among us. 
In such a world, the best that can be hoped for from our consti-
tutional law and discourse is that it guarantee mutual coexistence 
between weak and strong individuals, and between majority and 
minority communities. In a relentlessly agnostic world, we cannot 
expect, because we cannot even conceive of, normative growth. In 
such a world, resort to an outside "constitutive" authority is the best 
means of achieving that coexistence. In such a world, resort to 
authority is the only way to decide the permissibility of troubling indi-
vidual or communal forms of identity. In the agnostic tradition, con-
stitutional questions are by definition questions of authority and 
legitimacy, and not questions of normativity. 
IV. PRAGMATIC SELF IMAGES AND THE NORMATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 
Both the image of the self underlying and celebrated by liberal 
pluralism and the image of the community underlying and celebrated 
by civic repUblicanism, however, are susceptible to pragmatic as well 
as agnostic interpretations. The "self" and the "individual" cele-
brated by the "pragmatic-liberal" tradition is valued not for the tauto-
logical reason that the individual's preferences are themselves the 
source of value, but rather, for the pragmatic, tentative, and loosely 
empirical reason that an individualistic life is a good life; it is a life 
morally worth living. According to this tradition, the individual and 
the individual's values and preferences should be protected, because 
we believe that an "individual" life untrammeled by group pressure is 
a naturally social, moral, and productive life .. The "individual" can 
contribute value to the community as well as reap benefits from asso-
ciation because, if nurtured, she has a natural potential for creative 
and moral interaction with the material and social worlds. Individu-
alism is valuable because it is conducive to a more interesting, moral, 
and productive world, not because we are unable to judge between 
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competing visions. Differences are cherished because their presence 
makes life more meaningful, not because we have no moral grounding 
from which to judge. The differing desires, preferences, and wishes of 
particular individuals, then, are valued because their very presence 
reflects our commitment to a particular conception of a shared life 
worth living: The exercise of individual choice helps us "constitute" 
ourselves. The use of intellectual and creative capacities gives joy, 
and the freedom to choose our associations makes our lives more 
loving. 
Pragmatic individualism so conceived and exemplified in the lib-
eral theories of John Stuart Mill12 and John Dewey13 gives us an 
evolving, contested, but idealistic vision for the future toward which 
we should strive, and conception of the role of the individual in that 
ideal. It is not an excuse for agnostic contentment with whatever 
preferences and satisfactions we presently harbor. Pragmatic liber-
alism gives us a substantive criterion against which to judge the kinds 
of individuals we have become and are becoming, rather than a denial 
of the power of normative judgment. It provides a way to answer the 
question, "How should we constitute the self?" 
Similarly, the "community" celebrated by civic republicanism is 
also susceptible to a pragmatic rather than agnostic interpretation.· 
The community and the group are valued by the pragmatic republi-
can tradition not for the tautological reason that the community 
defines value, but for the concrete, contestable, and loosely verifiable 
reason that communal life is morally worthy. Living in a community 
with others make us more compassionate, broadens our sensitivities, 
enriches our discourse, and makes our lives more fulfilling. Commu-
nalliving is valued not because it provides us with a common defense 
against outside aggressors, and a common identity against strangers 
and strangeness, but because it fulfills a natural need for sociability 
and love. According to this tradition, the group has value because it 
enriches, rather than just defines, the lives of the individuals who it 
comprises. It enriches our lives by encouraging us to care for and 
about others, enlivens our tolerance by promoting different visions 
with which we can interact, and deepens our sense of potential by 
providing a community in which we can become immersed. Prag-
12. MILL ON BENTHAM AND COLERIDGE 39 (F. Leavis ed. 1950); Mill, On Liberty, in 
THE UTILITARIANS 473 (Dolphin ed. 1961); Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE UTILITARIANS 399 
(Dolphin ed. 1961). For a discussion of Mill's pragmatism, see West, In the Interest of the 
Governed: A Utilitarian Justification for Substantive Judicial Review, 18 GA. L. REV. 469 
(1984); West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 673 (1985). 
13. J. DEWEY, LIBERALISM & SOCIAL ACTION (1935). 
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matic communitarianism so conceived, and exemplified in the ancient 
writings of Aristotle, 14 and in the contemporary works of Unger l5 and 
MacIntyre, 16 gives us an idealistic, evolving, and contestable vision of 
the future toward which we should strive, and a conception, though 
susceptible to change, of the role of the community within it. It does 
not excuse agnostic contentment with the extant groups presently 
conceived. Like pragmatic liberalism, pragmatic republicanism pro-
vides a criterion against which to judge the communities in which we 
live and which we seek to form. Pragmatic republicanism provides a 
way to answer the moral question, "How should we constitute our 
community?" 
The pragmatic interpretations of our liberal and republican tradi-
tions also provide alternative interpretations of the constitutive liberal 
distrust of "the state," and the republican distrust of "the courts" 
respectively. Pragmatic as well as agnostic liberals maintain that the 
state generally should refrain from imposing a normative vision of the 
good upon individuals, just as pragmatic and agnostic republicans 
insist that the courts should not interfere with the normative visions 
developed by groups, including legislatures. But again, the reasons 
given contrast rather than compare. Pragmatic liberals agree with 
agnostic liberals that the state generally should not interfere in the 
lives of individuals, but not for the agnostic and absolutist reason that 
conceptions of the good are definition ally individualistic. Rather, the 
state should not intervene for the concrete, loosely empirical, and con-
testable reason that the state's power vis-a-:vis the individual gives its 
commitments undue weight. The pragmatic liberal's distrust of state 
power is thus premised on an assessment and distrust of the undue 
effect of power, not on the definitional claim that value is exclusively a 
function of individual preference. 17 Similarly, pragmatic republicans 
agree with agnostics that the courts generally should not interfere in 
the visions of the good promulgated by groups, including legislatures, 
but not for the agnostic and absolutist reason that conceptions of the 
good are definitionally legislative or group produced. Rather, courts 
should refrain from intervening for the concrete, contingent, loosely 
empirical, and contestable reason that the court's elitism and insular-
ity give its substantive commitments an undue "tilt," at least when 
14. ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS (H. Apostle & L. Gerson eds. 1986); NICOMACHEAN ETHICS: 
ARISTOTLE (M. Ostwald ed. 1962). 
15. R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); R. UNGER, 
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975). 
16. A. MACINTYRE, AFfER VIRTUE (1981). 
17. See, e.g., Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (I983) 
(defending superliberalism). 
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co.ntrasted with the co.mmitments o.f an ideally representative legisla-
ture. Thus, the pragmatic republican's distrust o.f judicial Po.wer is 
premised o.n an assessment o.f the effect o.f elitism and insularity o.n the 
value o.f the visio.n o.f the go.o.d pro.mulgated by the co.urts, and no.t o.n 
the definitio.nal claim that value is whatever a "co.mmunitarian" legis-
lature says it is. 18 
One majo.r difference, then, between these two. interpretatio.ns o.f 
o.ur Po.litical traditio.ns, is that the agno.stic interpretatio.ns rest o.n def-
initio.nal claims abo.ut value which permit no. exceptio.n, while the 
pragmatic interpretatio.ns rest o.n co.ntingent claims abo.ut the Wo.rld 
which may, in any particular case, no.t ho.ld. The agno.stic interpreta-
tio.ns are therefo.re abso.lute in a way that the pragmatic claims are 
no.t. The pragmatic interpretatio.ns o.f the liberal distrust o.f state 
interventio.n, and the republican distrust o.f judicial Po.wer o.ver legis-
lative determinatio.ns, pro.vide a basis fo.r the claim, in particular 
cases, that the general reaso.n fo.r state no.ninterventio.n o.r judicial pas- . 
sivity is not present, and that therefo.re state interventio.n o.r judicial 
activism is justified. Fo.r the pragmatic liberal, the state sho.uld gener-
ally no.t interfere in individual's lives o.r cho.ices no.t because it is the 
state, and thus no.t a so.urce o.f value, but rather, because o.f its crush-
ing and Po.tentially o.Ppressive Po.wer. Thus, if the state's explo.itative 
Po.wer do.es no.t Po.se a danger in a particular case o.r if it is o.utweighed 
by the influence o.f ano.ther Po.werful Po.litical o.r eco.no.mic acto.r, then 
from a pragmatic liberal perspective, reaso.ns fo.r state no.ninterventio.n 
dro.P away, and it beco.mes Po.ssible that the state o.ught to. intervene, 
even if this invo.lves state interference with the private preferences o.f 
individuals. Similarly, fo.r the pragmatic republican, the co.urts as a 
general rule sho.uld no.t interfere with legislative o.utco.mes, no.t 
because they are co.urts, and thus no.t a so.urce of value, but rather 
because their substantive visio.ns are marred by their insularity and 
elitism. Thus, if the co.urt's elitism and insularity do. not Po.se a dan-
ger in a particular case o.r are o.utweighed by the influence o.f o.ther 
elitist o.r insular fo.rces, then fro.m a pragmatic republican perspective, 
reaso.ns fo.r judicial passivity dro.P away, and it beco.mes Po.ssible that 
the co.urts o.ught to. intervene, even if this invo.lves judicial interven-
tio.n into. the legislative preferences o.f even legitimately co.nstituted 
gro.ups. 
The images o.f self, co.mmunity, the state, and the co.urts that 
underlie pragmatic liberalism and pragmatic republicanism have a 
great deal in commo.n, as evidenced by the bro.ad commo.n gro.und 
shared by Mill (a pragmatic liberal) and Aristo.tle (a pragmatic repub-
18. See, e.g., Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661 (1985). 
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lican). The images of self and community that underlie agnostic liber-
alism and agnostic republicanism are also similar, as evidenced by the 
law and economics theorists' dual endorsement of the sovereignty of 
individual choice and majoritarian power. Strikingly, the pragmatic 
interpretations of our two traditions jointly provide a conceptual 
grounding for the normative tradition in constitutional decisionmak-
ing, just as the agnostic interpretations provide a grounding for the 
authoritarian tradition. In the pragmatic liberal tradition, although 
there are good pragmatic reasons to distrust state intervention, there 
is no definitional reason for communitarian or state neutrality toward 
competing individualistic conceptions of the good life, and thus no 
definitional reason to refrain from normative decision making in diffi-
cult cases. The individual's preferences ought to be valued and pro-
tected against state interference because we have tentatively 
committed ourselves to a concrete but contestable conception of the 
value of individualism, and to a concrete, but contestable account of 
the danger of state power. Pragmatic liberalism accordingly entails a 
tentative vision of the good against which to judge particularly diffi-
cult, individual preferences for reproductive freedom, or questionable 
schemes of life, such as for prostitution or drug addiction. From a 
pragmatic liberal point of view, what we need to know, for example, 
in jUdging an individual's "preference" for contraceptives or early tri-
mester abortion and hence whether she has a "right" to it against 
legislative interference, is not simply that she has the "preference," 
but the extent to which the desired freedom from the reproductive 
consequences of sexuality facilitates a meaningful, strong, productive, 
and worthy individual life, and the extent to which legislative interfer-
ence with that preference would raise the spectre of state oppression. 
We need to ask, talk about, and assess whether this particular individ-
ual freedom for reproductive choice has made us better people. We 
need to ask, talk about, and assess whether legislative interference 
with this preference is grounded in and premised upon a felt legisla-
tive need to protect the status of the empowered, or grounded in a 
defensible vision of the good. 
Similarly, against the pragmatic republican tradition, there are 
good pragmatic reasons but no definitional reason for judicial neutral-
ity toward competing legislative pronouncements of the good and, 
again, no definitional bar to normative decisionmaking in difficult 
cases. Communitarian values and preferences ought to be protected 
against judicial interference because we have tentatively committed 
ourselves to a concrete but contestable conception of the ideal com-
munity, and a concrete but contestable account of the dangers that an 
insulated judiciary pose. From a pragmatic republican point of view, 
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then, we have a way to argue about difficult and challenged legislative 
preferences. What we need to know, for example, in judging the con-
stitutionality of an anti sodomy statute is whether the expressed 
homophobic value and the history behind it has made for a worthy 
community, and whether judicial interference with that vision would 
raise the dangers we generally associate with insulated and biased 
judgment. We need to ask, talk about, and assess whether 
homophobic bigotry, like racial bigotry, has hurt more than helped 
our communitarian instinct and communal life, and whether judicial 
intervention into that legislative vision would hinder more than pro-
mote our democratic goals. 
My general claim is that against a pragmatic, substantive inter-
pretation of our liberal and republican politics-and only against such 
a background-can the major "constitutional questions" of our time 
be answered within a normative tradition. Only if we have some ink-
ling as to why we value individualism, will we be able to ask meaning-
fully, and therefore answer tentatively the constitutional question, 
"How should we constitute the self?" If we know why we value indi-
vidualism, if we have in mind a vision of the ideal individualistic life, 
then we can meaningfully debate whether the individual should have 
the freedom to choose abortion, or be entitled to housing, or to say 
whatever she pleases. If we have no idea why we value individualism 
beyond our agnostic inability to express any normative commitments, 
then disagreement over particular individual entitlements begs for, 
deserves, and will receive an authoritarian answer. Similarly, only if 
we know why we value participation and community, will we then be 
able to ask the constitutional question, "How should we constitute the 
community?" If we know why we value communitarian life, then 
we will at least be able to discuss meaningfully the value we should 
give homophobic or racist group commitments. If we do not, then 
constitutional questions about particular communitarian commit-
ments again beg for, and will get, no better than authoritarian 
answers. The group, like the individual, can do what the Constitu-
tion or some other authority permits it to do. No more and no less. 
V. THE VALUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 
There are many obstacles to the normative tradition in constitu-
tional decisionmaking, and there are as many reasons to be skeptical 
of the value of democratizing constitutional modes of thought and 
debate. Judicial review may be one such obstacle, and the presence of 
the historical text itself-an authoritarian response to the dangers 
posed by the Articles of Confederation-is surely another. Our pres-
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ent amnesia regarding the very existence, much less the importance, 
the value, and the wisdom of our pragmatic liberal and republican 
traditions, is a third. If we want the Constitution to be more than 
parental-occasionally benign as in Brown v. Board of Education, 19 
but more often punitive, as in Hardwick-if we want to use constitu-
tional processes as a way of arguing about how we should constitute 
ourselves, instead of a way to figure out how we are authorized to 
constitute ourselves, we should reacquaint ourselves with forgotten 
wisdom, and reimmerse ourselves in neglected work. Liberals know 
more, or used to know more, about the value of individualism than is 
presently expressed in their modern solipsistic denial of the possibility 
of moral knowledge. Republicans surely know more about the value 
of community than is presently expressed in the conservative commit-
ment to extant communitarian and frequently chauvinistic or xeno-
phobic institutions, or the radical commitment to the largely 
unargued value of political participation. Similarly, we can do more 
than we now do. We can do more than simply reiterate empty claims 
and tautological definitions. We can describe and argue over when 
sociability makes our lives more meaningful, when it is simply oppres-
sive, when individualistic effort or choice is rewarding, and when it 
does nothing but leave us isolated. 
My original analogy may serve to underscore my main point. 
Imagine two schoolyards, one in which the pragmatic tradition of 
politics prevails, and the other in which the agnostic prevails. The 
first yard has a collected pool of wisdom regarding the value of games, 
the value of participation in those games, and the value of nonpartici-
pation. The second lacks such a tradition. Both are governed loosely 
by a rule requiring participation in games, and both must somehow 
decide whether a loner playing by himself is in violation of the rule. 
The first schoolyard will at least have the option of answering this 
constitutional question within the normative tradition. The partici-
pants will have some sense of why they value games and participation, 
and why they disfavor isolationism. They will at least have a history 
of having constituted themselves by reference to that accumulated 
experience. The second will lack that option. In fact, the second 
group will lack every option, other than to glean from the authorita-
tive text, and the authoritative teach~r that wrote it, whatever direc-
tion can be gleaned. The pragmatic tradition in the first schoolyard 
will prompt and facilitate normative constitutional decisionmaking. 
The agnosticism in the second virtually demands submission to the 
authority. 
19. 347 U.s. 483 (1954). 
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There are many things that we would do in some other world if 
our sole aim was to increase the participation in and the quality of the 
way we decide issues of public morality, which we nevertheless cannot 
do in this world. We cannot, for example, simply abolish the consti-
tutional text even if its existence frustrates more than facilitates nor-
mative debate, which I believe it does. We cannot reverse our 
historical commitment to judicial review even if judicial review frus-
trates citizen participation, which it probably does. We can, however, 
reinvigorate the pragmatic interpretations of our political theory. We 
can do so, in part, by emphasizing the historical existence and the 
importance of those traditions to our legal and constitutional institu-
tions. We can also do so by continuing to work within those interpre-
tive strategies. We can generate pragmatic, contextual accounts of the 
values of our individualistic and communitarian commitments. We 
have all lived in racially segregated or integrated communities, and 
attended racially segregated or integrated schools. We have lived 
with legalized abortion for over a decade. We have grown up in a 
culture that criminalizes homosexuality. We could reinvigorate our 
pragmatic traditions by simply describing how those experiences have 
enriched or deprived our senses of self and community. We could 
discuss whether and how the availability of legal abortion has 
enriched our sense of individual self-worth. We could describe what 
is surely a near-universal experience in this culture, the experience of 
learning homophobic fears. We could flood the market with prag-
matic constitutive arguments situated in our experiences of individual 
and social life, as those experiences relate to constitutive questions. If 
we do so, courts might be somewhat less inclined to claim that the 
wisdom of a majoritarian commitment or an individual contractual 
choice is beyond the scope of coherent debate. Constitutional debate 
might thereby become more normative. Only when constitutional 
debate becomes normative will it be a form of debate, or dialogue, in 
which the legal community can take pride, and which might be worth 
sharing. 
